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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT BESTOWS IMMUNITY FROM RICO
PROSECUTIONS UPON ANTI-ABORTION PROTESTORS
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir.
1992), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1992)
(No. 92-780)
In National Organization for Women v. Scheidler,1 the Seventh Circuit
concluded that violations of the Hobbs Act by anti-abortion activists do
not constitute the economically-motivated predicate acts required for the
imposition of liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act ("RICO"). 2
The plaintiff3 brought suit under RICO' against a coalition of anti-
abortion groups5 to prevent a nationwide campaign to close abortion
clinics by using illegal means.' The district court granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
1. 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), petition for cert filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1992)
(No. 92-780).
2. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
3. Plaintiffs included the National Organization for Women ("NOW"), the Delaware Wo-
men's Health Organization, and Summit Women's Health Organization. 968 F.2d at 614. NOW
sought class certification for itself, its women members, and other women who use or may use the
services of targeted health centers. Id. at 615 n.3. The health-center plaintiffs sued on behalf of
themselves and all similarly situated abortion clinics. Id. The district court deferred its ruling on
the class certification issue pending resolution of defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. All pending
motions were dismissed as moot when the court granted the motion to dismiss. Id.
4. Id. at 614. Plaintiffs' civil RICO suit was authorized by § 1964(c), which provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of
this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
NOW also brought suit under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), and raised several
pendant state claims. On appeal, however, the court found that Congress did not intend for the
antitrust laws to apply to the defendants' activities. 968 F.2d at 623.
5. Id. at 615. The independent groups operated in concert under the aegis of the Pro-Life
Action Network ("PLAN"). The named defendants included Pro-Life Action League, Pro-Life Di-
rect Action League, Operation Rescue, and Project Life. Id. The remaining defendant, Vital-Med
Laboratories, allegedly participated in a conspiracy to steal fetal remains for use at publicized buri-
als. Id. at 616. See infra note 52.
6. 968 F.2d at 614. The complaint alleged that anti-abortion activists engaged in the following
illegal activities to close women's health centers:
extortion; physical and verbal intimidation and threats directed at health center personnel
and patients; trespass upon and damage to center property; blockades of centers; destruc-
tion of center advertising; telephone campaigns designed to tie up center phone lines; false
appointments to prevent legitimate patients from making them; and direct interference
Washington University Open Scholarship
176 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 71:175
dure 12(b)(6). 7 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court
and held that RICO requires either an economically-motivated enterprise
or economically-motivated predicate acts.8 The court ruled that the de-
fendants' violations of the Hobbs Act could not substitute for the re-
quirement that the defendants' predicate acts have an economic
motivation. 9
The harassment of women visiting abortion clinics by anti-abortion ac-
tivists increased dramatically during the 1980s. 10 The renowned clinic
"blitzes" of Operation Rescue, a pro-life organization, typify anti-abor-
tion activists' increasingly violent tactics." In response to this threat to a
woman's right to visit an abortion clinic, abortion-rights advocates have
turned to the federal courts for protection, bringing civil suits under sev-
eral different laws, including RICO.12
with centers' business relationships with landlords, patients, personnel, and medical
laboratories.
Id. at 615.
7. Id. at 614. See National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 945 (N.D. Ill.
1991). The district court held that plaintiffs failed to allege economic motive. Id. at 939. The court
found that the supporters of the defendants' organization may have contributed to support external
activity, but their contributions were not derived from a pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at 944.
8. 968 F.2d at 614.
9. Id. at 629.
10. Janice Mall, About Women: Harassment ofAbortion Clinics Growing, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26,
1987, § 6, at 6. The Alan Guttmacher Institute conducted a survey of nearly two-thirds of all abor-
tion providers in the United States. The survey found that 47% of all abortion facilities experienced
harassment in 1985. Id. Among non-hospital facilities that provide abortions, the figures were even
more dramatic: 88% of these clinics reported at least one type of harassment and 73% reported
illegal anti-abortion harassment. Id. The survey asked clinics to report on six different forms of
illegal harassment. Forty-eight percent of the clinics reported bomb threats, 47% reported picketers
blocking patients from entering the building, 29% reported invasions of their facilities by anti-abor-
tion activists, 28% suffered vandalism, 22% reported jamming of telephone lines, and 19% re-
sponded that staff members had received death threats. Id.
11. For a revealing biography of Operation Rescue's founder, Randall Terry, see Susan Faludi,
The Anti-abortion Crusade of Randall Terry: Operation Rescue's Jailed Leader and his Feminist
Roots, WASH. PosT, Dec. 23, 1989, at C1. Operation Rescue spokespersons claim that they do not
condone violence. Id. However, in the training tapes that Terry distributes, he suggests that it may
be necessary to "physically intervene with violence ... with force [because] that is the logical re-
sponse to murder. [And] abortion is murder." Id. Terry's disciples have passionately followed his
instructions to intervene with violence on many occasions. From 1977 to 1989, anti-abortion activ-
ists attempted to burn or bomb 117 clinics, threatened to bomb 250 clinics, invaded 231 clinics, and
vandalized 224 clinics. Protesters have struck clinic employees with their cars and taken staff mem-
bers hostage. Id. Some protesters have even kidnapped patients. Id.
12. In Bray v. Alexandria Womens Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993), the United States
Supreme Court invalidated the clinics' efforts to bring suit under the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1873, 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988) (prohibiting conspiracies to deprive "any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws"). Until then, the clinics had enjoyed mixed success under § 1985 in the
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Section 1962(a) of RICO13 makes it unlawful for any person to use
income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to establish or
operate any enterprise14 whose activities affect interstate commerce. 15
The language of RICO does not explicitly require that the enterprise
lower federal courts. See, e.g., New York State NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1357-61 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding that abortion protestors acted within the scope of § 1985 when engaging in conspir-
acy to prevent women from obtaining access to abortion clinics), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990);
Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 580-81 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that women seeking
abortions are entitled to protection under § 1985(3) and a conspiracy to deprive women access to
abortion clinics is actionable under § 1985(3)); but see Roe v. Abortion Abolition Soe'y, 811 F.2d
931, 933-37 (5th Cir.) (holding that § 1985(3) protects class defined by common characteristics of
those against whom conspiracy is aimed and that the defendants' religious beliefs about abortion
were not sufficient), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); National Abortion Fed'n v. Operation Rescue,
721 F. Supp. 1168, 1170-72 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that subclass of women seeking to assert their
right to abortion was not entitled under § 1985(3) to proceed against abortion protestors and women
seeking abortion are not class needing special protection).
Clinics have also pursued claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). See
supra note 4 and accompanying text discussing Scheidler; Barr v. National Right to Life Comm.,
1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,315, at 74,408 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (dismissing clinic doctor's claim
against anti-abortion protectors' boycott of application for hospital privileges due to insufficient ef-
fect on interstate commerce); see also Dinah R. PoKempner, Note, The Scope of Noerr Immunityfor
Direct Action Protestors: Anti-Trust Meets the Anti-Abortionists, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 662, 670-677
(1989) (arguing that the Sherman Act applies to anti-abortion protestors).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) provides in relevant part that:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indi-
rectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of unlawful debt in
which such person has participated as a principal... to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in the acquisition of any interest
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
14. Section 1961(4) defines "enterprise" as including "any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
15. Id. On October 15, 1970, President Nixon signed into law Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act, commonly known as RICO. Id. President Nixon remarked that the omnibus legisla-
tion would provide federal law enforcement officials with the legal mechanism to "launch a total war
against organized crime." Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon 846
(1970).
Congress originally intended that RICO be used exclusively to combat organized crime. See S.
REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969) (stated purpose is the "elimination of the infiltration of
organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce.");
116 CONG. REc. 35,295 (1970) ("[RICO] ... provides the machinery whereby the infiltration of
racketeers into legitimate businesses can be stopped and the process be reversed when such infiltra-
tion does occur.") (remarks of Rep. Poff, floor manager of the bill). But see Gilbert v. Prudential-
Bache Sec., 769 F.2d 940, 942 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that the Supreme Court "refused to read into
civil RICO any requirement, unexpressed by Congress, that the statute be confined to situations
implicating organized crime"). The Supreme Court has recognized that "in its private civil version,
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have a profit-making motivation.16 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
expressly declined to resolve the issue of whether Congress intended
RICO to require an economic motivation. 17 Currently, three federal cir-
cuit courts of appeals require some form of economic motivation in order
to force a defendant to incur criminal liability under RICO. 18 Yet, the
RICO is evolving into something quite different from the original conception of its enactors."
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imprex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985).
Use of civil RICO has expanded dramatically since its enactment. Prior to 1985, courts issued 270
RICO decisions. Courts decided only 3% of these cases in the 1970s, 2% in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13%
in 1982, 33% in 1983, and 43% in 1984. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF CIVIL RiCO 5 n.21
(1991). Litigants have initiated RICO claims against individuals, American and foreign corpora-
tions, partnerships, labor unions, receivers, churches, colleges and universities, municipal officials,
municipal organizations, estates, and political party organizations. Id. at 177-79 (citations omitted).
16. Section 1961(1) defines a litany of predicate racketeering acts. Several lack an inherent
economic motive: murder; obstruction ofjustice; retaliation against a witness; and receipt of narcot-
ics. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). See generally Adam D. Gale, Note, The Use of Civil RICO Against
Anti-Abortion Protesters and the Economic Motive Requirement, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 1341 (1990)
(discussing the legislative history of RICO and the lack of the economic-motive requirement in the
statutory language). See also Mary L. Perry, Note, Judicial Creation of an Economic Requirement
Under RICO: Time to Dismantle the Barricade, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1021, 1036-38 (1990) (arguing
that the statutory language of RICO does not support limiting the Act to enterprises with an eco-
nomic motive).
17. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle,
868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989). McMonagle presented the Court with the
issue of whether RICO liability may be imposed in the absence of a profit-making element. Id. In
his dissent from the denial of certiorari, Justice White noted that the circuits disagreed on the eco-
nomic-motivation requirement and stated that he would grant certiorari to resolve the conflict. Id.
The Court has refused to add other requirements to RICO when the statutory language is silent.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imprex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). In Sedima, the Court addressed whether
§ 1962(c) of RICO required an additional racketeering injury.
Section 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or partici-
pate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(C) (1988).
The Court rejected this contention and concluded that the statute did not contemplate such an
"amorphous" requirement. The Court held that a violation of § 1962(c) requires: (1) conduct;
(2) of an enterprise; (3) through a pattern; (4) of racketeering activity. Id. at 496. In an explana-
tory footnote, the Court dismissed the lower court's concern about overstepping the intent of Con-
gress: "[G]iven the plain words of the statute, we cannot agree with the court below that Congress
could have no "'inkling of [§ 1964(c)'s] implications.'" Id. at 495 n.13.
18. But see supra note 17 (discussing McMonagle). See also United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d
961, 990-91 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (explaining that the proper inquiry is whether the enterprise conducted
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, not whether profit resulted), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1170 (1983); United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1328-29 & n.10 (9th Cir.) (explaining that
RICO proscribes criminal conduct without regard to the objectives of the individuals engaging in the
conduct), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981).
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Seventh and the Third Circuit differ on whether predicate acts which
constitute violations of the Hobbs Act permit a court to ignore the eco-
nomic-motivation requirement.
In United States v. Ivic, 19 the Second Circuit became the first of the
circuits to impose an economic-motive requirement for RICO convic-
tions. In Ivic, the court reversed the RICO convictions of four Croatian
nationalists.2' The court concluded that because RICO sections 1962(a)
and 1962(b)'s use of the term "enterprise" clearly referred to an organ-
ized profit seeking venture, the court must give the same meaning to the
term "enterprise" when used in subsection (c) of the statute.2z
Cognizant of RICO's liberal construction clause,22 the court neverthe-
less characterized political activity, at least when devoid of any financial
motive, as beyond the contemplated reach of RICO.2 3 The court con-
cluded that RICO excludes groups that do not generate a profit because
the Act only applies to organizations that produce revenue to infiltrate
legitimate businesses.2 4 Absent proof that an enterprise or its predicate
19. 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
20. Id. at 53. The defendants were convicted of attempting to murder a political opponent and
bombing a dance studio and travel agency. Id. at 53-55. The court held that the defendants had
political rather than economic motivations. Id. at 61.
21. Id. at 60-61. The court invoked the proposition that "[w]hen the same word is used in the
same section of an act more than once, and the meaning is clear in one place, it will be assumed to
have the same meaning in other places." Id. at 60 (citing United States v. Nunez, 573 F.2d 769, 771
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978)). See Turkette v. United States, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981)
(rejecting an ejusdem generis approach to interpreting RICO's statutory provisions); Perry, supra
note 16, at 1036-78 (discussing Turkette).
As additional support for its holding, the court relied upon the title of the Act and interpreted the
terms "corrupt" and "racketeer influenced" as connoting money making activities. Ivic, 700 F.2d at
61. "'The title of an act cannot control its words, but may furnish some aid in showing what was in
the mind of the legislature.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631
(1818)).
22. RICO's liberal construction clause provides that "the provisions of this title shall be liber-
ally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." The Second Circuit perceived its holding as
entirely consistent with this directive because the court believed that RICO's "remedial purposes"
would not be furthered if the statute covered terrorist activities. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 65 n.8.
23. Id. at 63.
24. Id. In this pre-Sedima decision, the court relied upon RICO's legislative history. 700 F.2d
at 62-63. Applying the rationale of United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), the court con-
cluded that RICO applies only to organizations which generate monies to serve as a "springboard
into the sphere of legitimate enterprise." Ivic, 700 F.2d at 63 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 593).
While Turkette defined "enterprise" as encompassing illegitimate organizations, the Second Circuit
perceived nothing in RICO to suggest that it reaches every such organization, "even one whose
animating long-term purpose and predicate crimes are political rather than pecuniary. Indeed, the
rationale of Turkette points decidingly the other way." Id.
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acts have a financial purpose,25 the Ivic court deemed section 1962(c) not
applicable.26
In United States v. Bagaric, the Second Circuit distinguished its hold-
ing in Ivic by stating that an economic motivation does not have to con-
stitute the predominant purpose motivating a RICO defendant's
predicate acts or enterprise.27 Bagaric also involved Croatian national-
ists, but in addition to their terrorist acts, the defendants also extorted
money from individuals unsympathetic to the Croatian's cause.28 Seek-
ing to avoid needless politicization of trials, the Court rejected the notion
that Ivic required an economic motive paramount to all others.29 The
Second Circuit concluded that courts should characterize an enterprise
according to its function rather than its structure.30 The court held that
when applying RICO to non-profit enterprises, a court could find an eco-
nomic motivation through a pattern of racketeering activity.31 Thus, in
Bagaric, the Second Circuit held that either the enterprise or the defend-
25. 700 F.2d at 61 n.6. The Ivic court recognized the defendants' non-pecuniary goals of elimi-
nating political opponents and winning publicity, but deferred judgment on the applicability of
RICO to organizations that extort money to further political objectives. See infra text accompany-
ing note 33 (discussing predicate acts with tangential economic purpose that further political
objectives).
26. 700 F.2d at 65.
27. 706 F.2d 43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
28. Id. at 48. In upholding the convictions, the court reasoned that "whether appellants ex-
torted money for the long-term political purpose of effecting the separation of Croatia from Yugosla-
via ... or whether [this] is an issue they care about not at all, the effect of their activities on the
national economy is identical... This effect is accomplished [by] whatever considerations compel
the creation and execution of an extortion scheme." Id. at 54.
29. Id. at 54. The court expressed concern that an inquiry to determine whether pecuniary
objectives superseded accompanying political or religious motives would only serve to "patronize the
jury and to add a distracting element of emotionalism to the proceedings. It would authorize the
admission of evidence of political beliefs, racial animosity, and family or blood feuds as justification
for criminal acts." Id. at 54-55.
30. Id. at 56.
31. Id. The court held that § 1964(a) appears to contemplate application of RICO to enter-
prises which, for example, are not themselves profit making, or which reinvest all their funds." Id.
Cf. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-81 (concluding that, in § 1964(a), use of the word "any" in a clause
dealing with unions and individuals that were associated in fact signaled a congressional intent to
impose no restriction upon associations embraced by the definition).
However, anti-abortion groups control the disposition of large sums of money. Operation Rescue
acknowledged the receipt of $300,000 in donations for 1989. Faludi, supra note 11, at Cl. Others
estimate that Operation Rescue annually receives over $1 million in donations. Id. One donor
alone, Rev. Jerry Falwell, publicly contributed $10,000, Id. During the summer of 1988, searchers
of an Operation Rescue hotel room in Atlanta discovered $50,000 in cash stuffed in a dresser drawer.
Id.
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32ant's predicate acts of racketeering must have some financial purpose.
Two years later, in United States v. Ferguson,33 the Second Circuit
further relaxed the requisite economic nexus between an enterprise and
independent predicate acts. In Ferguson, members of the Black Libera-
tion Army robbed armored trucks to obtain money to further their activ-
ities.34 Affirming the defendants' RICO convictions, the court concluded
that when the enterprise and the predicate acts are the same, a plaintiff
can use the same evidence to prove both elements of a RICO violation.35
Thus, in order to impose RICO liability a court need only find that the
predicate acts have some type of economic motivation.36 In United
States v. Flynn,3 the Eighth Circuit explicitly agreed with Ivic's holding
that a RICO defendant must operate an "enterprise ' 38 toward an eco-
nomic goal. 39  The Eighth Circuit, however, required proof of an eco-
nomic motive, independent of the commission of predicate acts.40 In
32. Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 56-57. In contrast to Bagaric, the Ivic court held that the enterprise
itself needed an economic motive. See Gale, supra note 16, at 1351 ("Thus, when Bagaric dismissed
the importance of focusing on the enterprise, it left no statutory language basis on which to ground
the economic motive requirement."). See also infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
33. 758 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985).
34. Id. at 853. The court found that "the defendants' activities centered around the commis-
sion of economic crimes." Id. The self-professed political revolutionaries perpetrated several ar-
mored truck robberies and murdered guards and police officers at the scene of the crimes. Id. They
used the proceeds to support fellow enterprise members and maintain safehouses for members who
were evading apprehension. Id. In Ferguson, the court addressed the Ivic court's refusal to extend
RICO's coverage to terrorist organizations which commit predicate acts to further their activity. Id.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. See also Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 57; Turkette 452
U.S. at 583. In Ferguson, the court explicitly rejected the defendants' claim that an "enterprise was
not proven independent of the predicate acts." 758 F.2d at 853. In support of its conclusion, the
court noted the presentation of other relevant evidence that established the existence of an enter-
prise. This evidence included: testimony regarding the Black Liberation Army's structure, ongoing
strategy and planning sessions, and connections among the criminal predicate acts. Id.
In essence, the court reiterated the Bagaric court's "elucidation" of Ivic. The court found nothing
in RICO that requires proof that the motivating force behind the defendants' actions was a "signifi-
cant economic purpose." ABRAmS, supra note 15, at 133.
36. See Gale, supra note 16, at 1369.
37. 852 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988).
38. The Eighth Circuit's definition of enterprise contains three elements: "(1) a common or
shared purpose; (2) some continuity of structure and personnel; and (3) an ascertainable structure
distinct from that inherent in a pattern of racketeering." Id. at 1051.
39. Id. at 1052. The Anderson court first articulated this conclusion. United States v. Ander-
son, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980). See infra note 40.
40. See Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1372. In Anderson, the lower court convicted two county judges
under RICO for defrauding the county citizens. Id. at 1361-62. The court stated in dictum that
"enterprise," as used in § 1961(4), must "exist[ ] for the purpose of maintaining operations directed
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Flynn, the defendant was charged with three predicate acts of murder
and attempted murder. 1 Although none of these crimes had an overt
economic motivation, the court nevertheless sustained the defendant's
RICO conviction because the enterprise's intent to gain control of a local
labor union promoted an economic purpose independent from the predi-
cate acts.42
In Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle,4 3 the Third Circuit obvi-
ated the need for an explicit economic motivation in civil RICO actions
premised on predicate offenses in violation of the Hobbs Act.' The de-
fendants, anti-abortion activists, engaged in increasingly violent protests
at an abortion clinic.4 5 Forswearing statutory interpretation, the court
focused on the plaintiff's novel use of the Hobbs Act46 to serve as a pred-
toward an economic goal that has an existence that can be defined apart from the commission of the
predicate acts constituting the 'pattern of racketeering activity.'" Id. at 1372 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(4)). Because the "enterprise" had no independent existence apart from the commission of
the predicate acts, the Anderson court reversed the defendants' convictions. Id. at 1369, 1375.
In congruence with Ivic, the Eighth Circuit also found that the term "enterprise" should be
interpreted uniformly throughout § 1962. "Congress... employed the identical term in all three
subsections [of § 1962] and defined the term in section 1961 without differentiation according to the
provision in which it appeared. Uniform definition thus appears more consistent with legislative
intent." Id. at 1366 n.12. But see United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974)
(explaining that "[e]nterprise" in subsections (b) and (c) has a different meaning than in subsection
(a)), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
41. Flynn, 852 F.2d at 1047.
42. Id. at 1052. Several commentators have posited that because the predicate acts in Flynn
did not have an independent economic objective, the Eighth Circuit failed to answer the question
whether it would allow a RICO conviction against an enterprise if the predicate acts did not have an
economic purpose. Thus, the court's apparent approval of this proposition is dictum. See Gale,
supra note 16, at 1353 (asserting that because the court found that the enterprise had an economic
goal its statement that an enterprise must be directed toward an economic goal was dictum); Perry,
supra note 16, at 1033 n.92 (arguing "that the Flynn decision did not resolve the question whether
the Eighth Circuit would allow a RICO claim against an enterprise without an economic goal if the
predicate acts did have an economic orientation").
43. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989). See supra note 17 (discussing
Justice White's dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari).
44. 868 F.2d at 1350. For the text of the Hobbs Act, see infra note 46.
45. Id. at 1345. The defendants illegally entered the clinic on four occasions, knocked down
and injured employees, threw medical supplies on the floor, and harassed patients. Ultimately, some
of the staff resigned and the clinic lost its lease, forcing it to move to another location. Id. at 1346-
47.
46. Id. at 1348. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' interference with the clinic's right to
operate its business violated the Hobbs Act. Id. A violation of the Hobbs Act is among the predi-
cate acts listed in § 1961(I)(b). Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 provides:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of
any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so
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icate offense under RICO.' The court noted that imposing liability
under the Hobbs Act does not require a finding of an economic motiva-
tion.48 The Third Circuit emphasized that the statutory language of
RICO permits a plaintiff to establish a pattern of racketeering activity by
demonstrating that the defendant committed any act indictable under the
Hobbs Act.49 Thus, when violations of the Hobbs Act constitute the
predicate offenses, the Third Circuit held that RICO does not require an
economically-motivated predicate act or enterprise for the imposition of
civil liability.50
In National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, l the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that when the defendant's predicate acts consist of violations of
the Hobbs Act, the plaintiff still must prove that either these predicate
acts or the defendants' enterprise has an economic motivation before a
court can impose civil liability under RICO. 2 In Scheidler, the court
to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance
of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined ......
18 U.S.C § 1961(l)(b) (1988).
Basically, "the Hobbs Act thus requires proof (1) that the defendant took or obtained tangible or
intangible property by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear and (2) that the
defendant's conduct obstructed, delayed or affected commerce." See ABRAMS, supra note 15, at 286.
The definition of property under the Hobbs Act is expansive. See, e.g., Stirone v. United States, 361
U.S. 212, 215 (1960) (explaining that the Act "speaks in broad language, manifesting a purpose to
use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by
extortion, robbery, or physical violence"); United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075-76 (2d
Cir. 1969) (explaining that "property" under the Act, "includes in a broad sense, any valuable right
considered as a source or element of wealth," including "a right to solicit business"), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1021 (1970); McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350 (explaining that "rights involving the conduct
of business are property rights"); Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92, 101
(2nd Cir. 1990) (discussing the broad definition of property in the Hobbs Act).
47. Id. at 1348, 1350.
48. Id. at 1350 (citations omitted).
The Third Circuit also rejected defendant's contention that civil RICO does not apply to politi-
cally motivated actions. Id. at 1348. Justifiably concerned with the First Amendment ramifications,
the court recognized that the First Amendment" 'does not shield from governmental scrutiny prac-
tices which imperil public safety peace or order."' Id. (quoting United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d
765, 772 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092 (1983)).
49. Id. at 1350 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B)).
50. Id.
51. 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.C.W. 3451 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1992)
(No. 92-780).
52. Id. at 629. See supra note 6 (listing the allegations in the complaint of defendants' illegal
activities).
During clinic "blitzes," protestors used a method called "lock and block" in which they pour glue
into clinic locks, and individual protestors lock themselves to clinic doors. 968 F.2d at 615. In
addition, at least two defendants entered a laboratory providing pathology and sanitary disposal
services to clinics and stole approximately 4000 aborted fetuses, "individually packaged and labeled
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endorsed McMonagle's recognition of Hobbs Act violations as predicate
RICO offenses. 3 However, the court expressly refused to allow Hobbs
Act predicate offenses lacking an economic motivation to serve a substi-
tute for the economic-motivation requirement.54 Using the language of
section 1962 to support its conclusion, 5 the court interpreted Congress'
use of the term "enterprise" as limiting the application of RICO to enti-
ties possessing an economic motivation. 6 Anticipating such a conclu-
sion, the plaintiffs argued that the Hobbs Act violations had an economic
motivation because the defendants intended the activities to increase the
plaintiffs' cost of operating the clinic. 7 Dismissing this inference, the
court reasoned that the defendants committed their acts of extortion to
force the plaintiffs to close the clinics.58 Notwithstanding the acknowl-
edgement that the defendants' activities resulted in a negative economic
effect to the plaintiffs, the court refused to equate that adverse effect with
the economic-motive requirement first formulated in Ivic.5 9
The court also held that the contributions received by the anti-abor-
... with the names of the mothers, doctors, dates and places the abortions were performed." Id. at
616.
53. Id. at 629-30. The Seventh Circuit does not require that the defendant profit economically
from the extortion to sustain a Hobbs Act conviction. See United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446
(7th Cir. 1983) (affirming a Hobbs Act conviction of anti-abortion activist who kidnapped a physi-
cian to stop him from performing abortions); see also Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue,
915 F.2d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Whether a Hobbs Act defendant personally receives any benefit
from his alleged extortion is largely irrelevant for the purpose of determining guilt under the Act.")
(quoting United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069, 1079-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820
(1981).
54. 968 F.2d at 629-30. The court stated that notwithstanding its agreement with the Third
Circuit's reading of the Hobbs Act, it refused to concur in its conclusion that "in circumstances
involving a non-economic enterprise conducting non-economic acts, plaintiffs may invoke the provi-
sions of RICO." Id.
55. Id. at 629.
56. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied directly on the Second Circuit's interpreta-
tion of § 1962(a) and (b) in Ivic. See Ivic, 700 F.2d at 61.
57. Schiedler, 968 F.2d at 620. Anti-abortion protests interfere with the conduct of abortion
clinic business and thus have a direct economic impact. See, eg., McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1346-47
(abortion clinic forced to install sophisticated security system to deter repeated trespasses by anti-
abortion demonstrators); American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 613 F.
Supp. 656, 658-61 (1985) (physicians refused to work at clinics under same management as clinic
that was target of protest); see PoKempner, supra note 12, at 665-68 ("Protests that seek to interfere
with the conduct of business force abortion clinics to invest more heavily in security measures, insur-
ance, and litigation, and make it more difficult for clinics to retain qualified personnel. When protes-
tors succeed in increasing clinic costs or forcing clinics out of regional markets, the effect may be to
restrain competition to the detriment of consumers.") (footnotes omitted).
58. 968 F.2d at 630.
59. Id.
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tion activists did not constitute sufficient economic motivation to satisfy
the requirement that a predicate act have an economic objective.' The
plaintiffs acknowledged the indirect nature of the contributions; how-
ever, they argued that this was sufficient because section 1962(a) included
indirect finding of enterprises. 61 Rejecting this interpretation of section
1962(a), the court held that the weak causal connection between the de-
fendants' predicate acts and their receipt of donations did not constitute
the requisite economic motivation.62
The court concluded that for the purposes of section 1962(a), income
is that which the defendants would not have received "but for" their
racketeering conduct.63 Applying this "but for" test, the court held that
the donations received by the defendant did not constitute income within
the meaning of section 1962(a).64
The court next determined that the Pro-Life Action Network
("PLAN")65 as an enterprise failed to possess an economic motivation
pursuant to section 1962(c). 66  The Seventh Circuit held that when
neither the enterprise nor the racketeering acts have an economic moti-
vation, a court should not impose civil RICO liability.67 Although the
court acknowledged the Supreme Court's concern of facilitating enforce-
ment of RICO,68 the court asserted that its holding only defined the ele-
ments of RICO rather than imposing additional requirements on
plaintiffs or prosecutors to prove RICO violations.69
The Seventh Circuit's refusal to recognize the similarities between eco-
nomic motivation and economic impact is shortsighted.70 First, the
60. Id. at 625.
61. Id. See supra note 13 for the text of § 1962(a).
62. 968 F.2d at 625. 'That reprehensible criminal and tortious conduct results incidentally in
donations to support it, is more a comment on the nature of defendants' supporters than on the
purpose of the defendant's acts." Id. at 630.
63. 968 F.2d at 625.
64. Id. The shortcoming was inadequate pleading rather than faulty logic. However, based
upon the tenor of the opinion, if the plaintiffs alleged a direct nexus between predicate acts and
contributions, the court most likely would not have sustained a RICO conviction.
65. See supra note 5.
66. 968 F.2d at 626. The Seventh Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit's definition of "enter-
prise." See Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1372; see also supra notes 35-40. But see Bagaric, 700 F.2d at 57
(concluding that proof of enterprise and predicate acts are functionally equivalent).
67. 968 F.2d at 626 (emphasis added).
68. See supra note 17.
69. 968 F.2d at 629.
70. Trapped within the outdated Ivic paradigm, the court attempted to justify its conclusion by
1993]
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court's reliance on the Ivic 1i framework allowed the court to ignore the
exponential growth of civil RICO suits during the last decade. 2
Although commentators have described RICO's language as complicated
and mysterious,7 3 the Supreme Court has held that courts should inter-
pret and apply RICO broadly. 4
Second, the Seventh Circuit failed to extend the Ivic line of cases to its
logical conclusion.75 As the Second Circuit recognized in Bagaric, the
effect of extortion activities on the national economy rather than the in-
tent of the extortionist determines the applicability of RICO. 6 Given its
reluctance to limit the scope of civil RICO,77 the Seventh Circuit logi-
cally should have expanded the economic-motivation requirement to en-
compass economic impact.7"
Finally, section 1961(1) expressly defines racketeering activity as en-
compassing Hobbs Act violations. 79 Despite the Seventh Circuit's recog-
nition of this definition,"0 the court insisted upon proof of an
economically motivated enterprise when violations of the Hobbs Act
constitute the predicate acts. Yet, RICO itself imposes no such
requirement.81
The Scheidler decision is an unwarranted restriction of an inherently
expansive statute. Any belated attempt to curtail RICO's civil applica-
noting that "[n]one of the cases discussing an economic motive requirement adopt the plaintiffs'
theory that raising victim's costs satisfies the requirement." Id.
71. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 15.
73. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 644 (D. Alaska
1982); Sam Roberts, Legal Maneuvering Transforms Gang Into Racketeers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
1988, at BI; Jed S. Rakoff, Spirit of Enterprise, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 13, 1986, at 1.
74. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497-98.
75. See supra notes 19-36 and accompanying text.
76. See Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 54.
77. 968 F.2d at 629. See, eg., Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975-76 (7th Cir.
1986) (multiple schemes not required for pattern of racketeering activity); Schacht v. Brown, 711
F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.) (rejecting argument that RICO is limited to organized crime), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1002 (1983).
78. RICO's legislative history supports this proposition. See, eg., Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1072
("Organized crime ... annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful
conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud and corruption."); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
78 (1969) ("[Ihe time has come for a frontal attack on the subversion of our economic system by
organized criminal activities."); see Gale, supra note 16, at 1367.
79. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
80. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 629.
81. See supra note 16.
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tion disregards Congress' deliberate policy choices to defy judicial con-
finement.82 Absent constitutional restrictions, Congress rather than the
judiciary should address any difficulties or discontentment with RICO's
sweeping application.
Frans J. von Kaenel
82. See Haroco v. American Nat'1 Bank & Trust, 747 F.2d 384, 398-99 (7th Cir. 1984). See
also supra notes 15, 17.
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